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A FOUNDATION OF GRANITE OR
SAND? THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND UNITED
STATES BILATERAL IMMUNITY
AGREEMENTS
INTRODUCTION

S

cholars of international law heralded the signing of the
July 1998 Rome Statute, establishing the International
Criminal Court,1 as long overdue, auspicious, controversial, or
simply wrong.2 Nowhere in international law has a debate
raged so fiercely over the legitimacy of a court, the evolution of
the controlling law and the need for global cooperation as it has
in the field of international criminal law.3 For many organizations and political bodies, many of which had labored indefatigably to salvage and promote human rights, the establishment
of the Court stood as the physical embodiment of their efforts.4
After decades of flagrant human rights violations coupled with

1. Hereinafter “ICC.”
2. Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and its Implication for
Domestic Law and National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215 (2002);
International Criminal Court, Historical Introduction, at http://www.icccpi.int/php/show/php?id=history (last visited Nov. 14, 2003); Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, The International Criminal Court, at http://www.
lchr.org/international_justice/icc/icc.htm (last visited on Nov. 14, 2003).
3. See International Criminal Court, Historical Introduction, supra note
2.
4. Upon the ratification of the Rome Statute, Amnesty International published a favorable commendation of the ICC and its goal of eradicating unaccountable perpetrators of human rights violations. “This is a very important
moment in the struggle for international justice, because it means that people
suspected of committing crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide –
no matter what their rank – may be tried by the court.” Amnesty International further praised the mission and the authority of the court when it
wrote, “A message is being sent around the world that people planning the
worst crimes and human rights violations can no longer do so in the knowledge that they won’t be held accountable.” Press Release, Amnesty International, The International Criminal Court – a Historic Development in the Fight
for Justice (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org.
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impunity,5 a concerted initiative for an international criminal
court was launched in the General Assembly in 1991.6 But
breathing life into the Court proved to be a Herculean task for
the international community, resulting in a half-decade struggle to determine (1) which crimes would fall under the jurisdiction of the Court; (2) what structure and rules would be implemented for its effective operation; and (3) from what source
would the Court derive its jurisdiction – from state consent,7
territoriality8 or universal jurisdiction?9
Under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s jurisdiction
originates from state consent,10 which manifests itself through
either territorial or nationality jurisdiction.11 Alternatively, the
ICC’s ultimate and most compelling source of authority may
rest, however, in the philosophical natural laws underpinning
the relationship between the international community’s rights

5. On the eve of its one year anniversary, the ICC stated, “In the past
century, millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.” Press Kit, International Criminal Court, First Anniversary of the Court (Jul. 1, 2003),
available at http:www.icc-cpi.int/php/index.php.
6. Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 2002 ARMY LAW 1, 4 (2002).
7. For the purposes of this article, the word “state” means “country,”
which is the customary vernacular of international law scholarship and practice.
8. Infra note 34.
9. Infra note 37.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9,
art. 12 - 13 (1998) (United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998), reprinted in, 37 I.L.M. 998 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
10. “Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction: A State which becomes a
Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to the crimes referred to in article 5.” Id. art. 12 (1).
11.
[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction
of the court in accordance with paragraph 3: The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of
that vessel or aircraft; The State of which the person accused of the
crime is a national.
Id. art. 12(2)(a)-(b).
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and the correlative duties vested in the states.12 Where such a
relationship exists, the states are under an obligation to uphold
and defend not only their citizens’ rights but also the rights of
the international community at large.13 This obligation springs
from a complex relationship between international crimes, jus
cogens and obligations erga omnes that has developed in customary international law.14 Where that relationship imposes an
affirmative duty on a state to adjudicate, convict and punish
violators of international human rights, a state cannot shirk
that duty.15
This complex relationship between the international communities’ right to prosecution and the states’ duties to comply is
not sufficiently protected, however, by consent or territorialbased jurisdiction. Instead, universal jurisdiction provides the
strongest basis underpinning the ICC’s authority, allowing for a
more effective and formidable court.16 Under the Rome Statutes’ principle of complimentarity,17 the authority of the ICC is
triggered when a state is unable or unwilling to fulfill its duties
to the international community, which demand that the state
adjudicate international criminal offenses subject to universal
12. For the legal model on correlative rights and duties in a contract form,
see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913). Infra note 86.
13. NINA H.B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 217 (2000).
14. See Marjorie Cohn, How U.S. Opposition to International Court Jeopardizes U.S. Troops, Sep. 10, 2003, at http://cnn.com (last visited Sep. 15,
2003) [hereinafter How U.S. Opposition].
15. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at
30-31.
16. Kofi Annan, in a message to the United Nations, asserted that “[o]nly a
permanent court with universal jurisdiction can finally lay to rest the charge
that the international community is being selective or applying double standards in deciding which crimes to investigate and punish.” Kofi Annan, Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY xiii (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
17. “[T]he Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: The
case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the
State genuinely to prosecute.” Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
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jurisdiction.18 Essentially, this means that the state’s duty is
then discharged to the ICC, under the jus cogens and obligations erga omnes doctrines of customary international law.19
Any treaty or agreement violating or impeding that discharge of
duty violates customary international law.20
As of May 2004, ninety-four states had ratified the Rome
Statute.21 The United States is not one of these countries, and
has been vociferous in its opposition, expressing strong reservations over the legitimacy of the ICC and its jurisdiction over
United States citizens.22 Less than five years after the Rome
Statute authorized the ICC’s creation, the United States
launched an unprecedented campaign to secure bilateral immunity agreements.23 The agreements explicitly exempt United
18. Id. art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
19. On the discharge of duty to the ICC, Amnesty International wrote that
the states that ratified the Rome Statute “have accepted the primary obligation to investigate and prosecute people accused of the crimes and when they
are unable or unwilling to do so the International Criminal Court may bring
them to justice.” Press Release, Amnesty International, The International
Criminal Court, supra note 4.
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art.
53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
21. International Criminal Court, States Parties, available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/statesparties.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).
22. See The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen
and Officials From the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 1-2 (2000) (statement of Sen. Jesse
Helms, Chairman, Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations); Id. at 4-5 (statement
of Hon. Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Sec. of Def.); see also Human Rights
Watch, ‘New Justice’ vs. Impunity: The International Criminal Court, Jun. 18,
2003, at http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/icc061803.htm; see generally,
Human Rights Watch, United States Efforts to Undermine the International
Criminal Court: Legal Analysis of Impunity Agreements, at http://www.hrw.
org/campaigns/icc/docs/art98analysis.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
23. The United States has engaged in a
widespread campaign to undermine and marginalize the ICC to prevent it from becoming an effective instrument of justice. … The bilateral agreements sought by Washington would require states to send
an American national requested by the ICC back to the U.S. instead
of surrendering him/her to the ICC. Importantly, Washington’s
agreement would remove the ICC’s oversight function, which is the
fundamental principle underpinning the Rome Statute and is critical
to close the door on impunity.
Human Rights Watch, Bilateral Immunity Agreements, Jun. 20, 2003, available at http://www.hrw.org.
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States citizens from the ICC’s reach.24 The United States’ efforts to obtain immunity agreements have invigorated the debate over the ICC’s legitimacy and underline the importance of
the court’s jurisdictional basis.25
Part I of this note defines and identifies international crimes
subject to universal jurisdiction and within the scope of the International Criminal Court. Part II discusses a state’s duty under recognized doctrines of international law to punish perpetrators of those international crimes and the correlative right
held by the international community to expect and demand adjudication. Part III suggests that if a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute those crimes, the state must discharge that
duty to the ICC. Part IV asserts that the United States’ bilateral immunity agreements restricting the authority of the ICC
contravene the United States’ duty to the international community and hence are illegal under jus cogens.
In April of 1999, less than a year after the signing of the
Rome Statute and the birth of the ICC, a human rights crisis of
mass proportions raged in Kosovo.26 Academics, politicians, diplomats, and the media all grappled with the following issues: (1)
humanitarian intervention; (2) genocide and other international
crimes of that nature; (3) a state’s privilege or obligation to intervene, prevent, or punish such crimes; and, (4) where to fit
the ICC into the landscape of international criminal law.27 One
commentator, writing on the unheeded threats made by the
Clinton administration to Slobodan Milosevic to impose warcrime prosecutions, concluded, “These threats have had no visiThe list of countries that have signed Bilateral Immunity Agreements
with the United States continues to grow. The list of states that have succumbed to the United States’ pressures to sign includes Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Colombia, Dominican Republic, East Timor, El Salvador, Georgia, Honduras,
Romania, India, Israel, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and
Tajikistan. Many of these countries have reciprocal agreements with the
United States that grant their citizens immunity from the ICC when on
United States territory. Id. at 7-13.
24. See Cohn, How U.S. Opposition, supra note 14.
25. Id.; see also John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
167 (2001).
26. See John R. Bolton, Clinton Meets “International Law” in Kosovo, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 5, 1999, at A23.
27. Id.
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ble effect, and thus provide yet another compelling piece of evidence why the new International Criminal Court – created in
nearby Rome just this last summer – rests on a foundation of
sand.”28
By firmly establishing that the ICC’s jurisdiction is implicitly
derived from universal jurisdiction, regardless of consent, nationality, or territorial jurisdiction, the ICC’s foundation would
be solid, as the protection the ICC affords to the relationship
between rights and duties could not be eroded by bilateral immunity agreements or any other attempts to limit its scope and
reach.
I. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES SUBJECT TO UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. The Birth of International Crimes
Before World War II and the Nuremburg trials, very few
crimes enjoyed the status of “international crimes.” While two
crimes, piracy29 and slavery30, had gained general consensus as
subject to universal jurisdiction, it was not without considerable
debate.31 In the early twentieth century not all scholars were
persuaded that universal jurisdiction applied. As a result, a
debate raged in the scholarly rhetoric as to what form of jurisdiction was best applied to these crimes committed on the high
seas and across international borders.32

28. Id.
29. “A pirate is defined as one who, without legal authority from any State,
attacks a ship with intention to appropriate what belongs to it.” In re Piracy
Jure Gentium (1934) AC 586, 594-95 (internal quotes omitted).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1980).
31. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 (4th ed. 1997).
32. Subscribing to the universal jurisdiction paradigm, Shaw wrote:
Universal jurisdiction over piracy has been accepted under international law for many centuries and constitutes a long-established principle of the world community. All states may both arrest and punish
pirates, provided of course that they have been apprehended on the
high seas or within the territory of the state concerned. The punishment of the offenders takes place whatever their nationality and
wherever they happen to carry out their criminal activities.
Id.

File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc

2004]

Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM

Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

211

Some international legal scholars clung tenaciously to their
preference for adjudication of criminal acts in domestic courts
as opposed to international forums.33 The twentieth-century
scholar Georg Schwarzenberger, subscribing to the “statesovereignty” or “territorial”34 international legal theory, concluded in 1950 that “international criminal law in any true
sense does not exist.”35 “Territorial” scholars, such as Schwarzenberger, concluded that the crime of piracy was adjudicable
On the other hand, “naturalist”
only in domestic courts.36
scholars,37 including scholars who prescribe to universal juris33. As late as the 1950s, seasoned international law scholars debated over
whether criminal acts could ever come under the auspices of international
jurisdiction. See John F. Murphy, International Crimes, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 362 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1997), citing
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 3
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 263, 295 (1950).
34. The territorial principle of criminal jurisdiction is that “courts of the
place where the crime is committed may exercise jurisdiction.” IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 1998). Brownlie discuses the practical advantages of this theory of international criminal jurisdiction, including amongst them “a convenience of the forum and the presumed involvement of the interests of the state where the crime is committed.” Id. Shaw writes, in further support of the territorial principle, “That a
country should be able to prosecute for offenses committed upon its soil is a
logical manifestation of a world order of independent states and is entirely
reasonable since the authorities of a state are responsible for the conduct of
law and the maintenance of good order within that state.”
SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 458-59.
35. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 362. Schwarzenberger and others of his school of thought held solidly to the opinion that “an
international criminal law that is meant to be applied to the world powers is a
contradiction in terms. It presupposes an international authority which is
superior to these states.” Id.
36. Schwarzenberger held that all crimes were of a nature most effectively
handled in domestic courts:
The rules of international law both on piracy jure gentium and war
crimes constitute prescription to States to suppress piracy within
their own jurisdiction and to exercise proper control over their own
armed forces, and an authorization to other States to assume an extraordinary criminal jurisdiction under their own municipal law in
the case of piracy jure gentium and of war crimes committed prior to
capture by the enemy.
Id.
37. Two theories of international jurisdiction seem to fit nicely under the
naturalist theory – that of the “universality” principle, which “justifies the
repression of some types of crime as a matter of international public policy,”
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diction, believed piracy was in the domain of the international
community, subject to global jurisdiction because of its universally detrimental effects.38 Pirates traversing international waters often brandished the flag of their country of origin; yet they
did not sail under the authority of that or any country.39 Further, piracy was more palatably a crime subject to universal
jurisdiction because (1) the crime occurred in international waters or on the “high seas”; (2) the pirate showed allegiance to no
country (only to himself); and (3) consequently, the pirate had
abandoned the protection or safeguards of his proclaimed state
of affiliation.40
Slavery, also characterized by perpetration on the high seas
and transnational, borderless activities, shared an early birth
as an established international crime.41 The preponderance of
scholars and practitioners of international law now readily acknowledge that states have a right to exert universal jurisdic-

and the more general “crimes under international law,” which expands the
domain of the universality principle to incorporate crimes that “breach international law.” Universality when taken to this broader expanse allows that
some crimes “may be punished by any state which obtains custody of persons
suspected of responsibility.” BROWNLIE, supra note 34, at 307-08.
38. The United Nations and scholars subscribing to universality ideologies
arrived at a different view than the “territorial” scholars, advancing in the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas that “the view of ‘piracy’ as a crime
against international law seek[s] only a tribunal with jurisdiction to apply
that law and punish the criminal.” Murphy, International Crimes, supra note
33, at 363, citing A. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 319-37 (1988).
39. In Re Piracy Jure Gentium, the Privy Council called the pirate “a sea
brigand. He has no right to any flag and is justiciable by all.” In re Piracy
Jure Gentium (1934) AC 586, 594-95.
40. The Privy Council justified universal jurisdiction over the crime of
piracy by distinguishing crimes committed on “terra firma” [firm land] as
falling under the domain of the “municipal law of each country” from crimes
committed on the “high seas,” which were “justiciable by any State anywhere.”
Id. at 589. The Privy Council also held that the pirate, by committing his acts
of piracy, “placed himself beyond the protection of any State. He is no longer
a national, but “hostis humani generis.” Id.
41. The 1815 Declaration of the Congress of Vienna “equated traffic in
slavery to piracy.” Since that time, slavery has been subjected to the same
“universal condemnation that existed with respect to piracy.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives
and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 112-13 (2001), citing M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONVENTIONS AND THEIR
PENAL PROVISIONS 637-734 (1997).
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tion over piracy and slavery, the first acts to come under the
heading of “international crimes.”42
B. Nuremburg and Beyond
The question of whether criminal acts could transcend the
traditional domestic-modeled jurisdictions and demand a more
expansive accountability to an international legal body was presented to the international community with an unprecedented
urgency in the aftermath of World War II.43 This period,
marked by an unparalleled human rights crisis, initiated a debate and ultimately an affirmation that some crimes reach such
proportion and level of atrocity as to demand accountability to
humanity at large.44 At Nuremberg, the Military Tribunal “proclaimed the existence of two ‘new’ crimes under international
law – crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.”45

42. See SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 470; Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 41, at 112-13.
43. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 364; SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 471.
44. In the aftermath of World War II, the widespread effect and heinous
nature of the war crimes committed under the Nazi regime caused outrage in
the international community and it seemed the natural progression of international law to try the perpetrators of these atrocious acts. Yet this was not
the first time war crimes had been addressed in the international arena. In
1927, in the wake of World War I, French Extradition Law provided that “acts
committed in the course of a civil war would not be protected as political offences if they were acts of odious barbarism and vandalism prohibited by the
laws of war.” I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1971)
(internal quotes omitted). Therefore, the trials at Nuremberg were consistent
with a growing global effort towards eradicating war crimes and holding those
responsible for their instigation liable. Id. at 185-87.
45. “Crimes against humanity clearly cover genocide and related activities.” SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 472.
The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia provided
that
[C]rimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and
are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed
conflict, international or internal in character and that crimes
against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature,
such as willful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.
Id., citing Security Council Resolution 827 (1993).
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This proclamation advanced a growing list of international
crimes and evidenced an emergent awareness of the necessary
international accountability required to squelch crimes committed against humanity as a whole.46 All the individuals involved
in prosecuting at the Nuremburg trials recognized the global
responsibility to vindicate the crimes that had occurred under
Hitler and his Nazi regime.47 At Nuremburg, a foundation was
laid down for future international remedies for international
crimes.48
Hence, in the immediate years following World War II, crimes
such as “genocide,”49 “ethnic cleansing”50 and “war crimes”51 re-

The Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda defines crimes
against humanity as crimes committed “as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds,” encompassing “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and
religious grounds, and other inhumane acts.” Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 3, Security Council Resolution 955 (1994).
46. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 364, citing the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, 6 FRD 69, 107 (1946). Murphy
contends that the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the
General Assembly on December 9, 1948, both affirming the “new crimes,”
support the proposition that punishment for crimes against peace and against
humanity is “recognized broadly as international customary law.” Id.; see also
Peter Burns, An International Criminal Tribunal: The Difficult Union of
Principle and Politics, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 127
(Roger Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1994).
47. Justice Jackson, as Chief Prosecutor for the United States, said in his
opening statement,
The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against
the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. … That four
great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the
hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to
the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that
Power has ever paid to Reason. We must never forget that the record
on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history
will judge us tomorrow.
Benjamin Ferencz, From Nuremberg to Rome: A Personal Account (2004),
available at http:www.benferencz.org/feb20041.htm.
48. Id.
49. Genocide, as defined by the United Nations Security Council in Article
2 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, includes any of the
following acts
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ceived universal condemnation from the international community.52 The development of customary international law defining these crimes and promoting their prosecution has led to
global cooperation in creating ad hoc tribunals, such as the In[C]ommitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the
group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group.
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, supra note 45.
50. In its resolution creating an international tribunal for the prosecution
of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
in Yugoslavia, the Security Council included in the list of reported crimes over
which it had “grave alarm” “mass killings, massive, organized and systematic
detention and rape of women, and the continuance of the practice of ethnic
cleansings.” S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Year, 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); see also the Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-Sixth Session, UN G.A.O.R., 49th Sess, Supp.No.10 UN
Doc.A/49/10 (1994).
51. The four Geneva “Red Cross” Conventions of 1949 extended universal
jurisdiction over “grave breaches” of crimes against humanity, which included
“willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, unlawful deportation of protected persons and the taking of hostages.” The list was later extended to
include “attacking civilian populations.” SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 31, at 471, citing G. I. D. DRAPER, THE RED CROSS CONVENTIONS, 105
(1958).
52. “War crimes and genocide are now widely accepted as being susceptible
to universal jurisdiction.” REBECCA WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (2002).
In support of this rule of customary international law, Wallace points to two
separate instances, the first, the Eichmann Case, in which Israel claimed
jurisdiction on grounds that “a universal course (pertaining to the whole of
mankind), [ ] vests the right to prosecute and punish crimes of this order in
every state within the family of nations.” Id. at 114; see also, AttorneyGeneral of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 5 (1961); Kenneth
C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV.
785 (1988).
Randall notes that Israel’s assertion of jurisdiction over
Eichmann was distinct from previous Nazi trials in that “the state of Israel
did not exist when Eichmann committed his crimes.” However, “the fact that
Israel was not a state when Eichmann acted does not affect the legitimacy of
Israel’s jurisdiction under the universality principle.” Id., at 814.
Second, Wallace finds support for universal jurisdiction over war crimes and
genocide in the Charter of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, art. 6, “which
referred to crimes against peace, violations of the laws and customs of war,
and crimes against humanity and for which there was to be individual responsibility… [T]he judgment[s] of the Tribunal are now accepted as international
law.” WALLACE, supra at 52.
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ternational Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia,53 international courts, such as the War Crimes Tribunals in Sierra Leone and Cambodia,54 and forums such as the
South African Human Rights Commission and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights,55 all sufficiently
equipped with the legal tools and precedents to try the perpetrators of international crimes.
The growing body of international documents that address
war crimes and crimes against humanity strive to effectively
and efficiently make those who perpetrate them accountable
before any competent body, domestic or international, capable
and willing.56 In 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide set guidelines for punishing genocide.57 The Convention declared genocide punishable
during times of war as well as “in the absence of international
armed conflict” and classified genocide as a “crime under international law” subject to universal jurisdiction.58
Almost thirty years later, in 1973, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 3074, “Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity,” which declared that “States shall co53. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, at http://
www.ictr.org/default.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.
htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
54. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, at http://www.sc-sl.org/ (last visited
Aug. 24, 2004); Special Tribunal for Cambodia, at http://www.global
policy.org/intljustice/camindx.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
55. See South African Human Rights Commission, at http://
www.sahrc.org.za/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, at http://www.achpr.org/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2004); Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/De
faultE.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2004).
56. See SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 472.
Following World War II, many of the international documents and bilateral
and multilateral treaties promulgated in an effort to apprehend and try those
responsible for war crimes avoided the use of the word ‘extradition’ in an effort to “give States the widest latitude in resorting to measures of rendition.”
SHEARER, supra note 44, at 186.
57. G.A. Res. 260A(III) of 9 Dec. 1948. U.N. Treaty Series No. 78, at 279.
58. Nigel S. Rodley, The International Legal Consequences of Torture, Extra-Legal Execution, and Disappearance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS 177-78 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989).

File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc

2004]

Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM

Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

217

operate with each other on a bilateral and multilateral basis
with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and shall take the domestic and international measures necessary for that purpose.”59 Although the
resolution specified that “every State has the right to try its
own nationals for war crimes or crimes against humanity” and
asserted that “persons against whom there is evidence that they
have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity shall
be subject to trial and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a general rule in the countries in which they committed those
crimes,” the resolution does not preclude or exclude other States
from apprehending and prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes
and in fact calls for State cooperation.60
After Nuremberg, the international community gradually
amassed a substantial list of international crimes, evidenced
through treaties, General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions, and case law under which states had the privilege to
adjudicate criminals under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, regardless of whether the crimes had been perpetrated
within their domestic borders or by their nationals.61 International crimes of torture, slavery and/or deportation or forcible
transfer of population, whether or not they were on a “massive”
scale or “systematically” carried out, were firmly rooted in that
doctrine.62 Torture, defined as any act by which “severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such
purposes as obtaining… information or confession, punishing
him for an act he has committed or is suspected… or intimidat-

59. Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity. G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp.
No. 30, at 78 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
60. Id. ¶ 2-3, 5.
Scholars have embraced this broader allowance of universal jurisdiction as
well. “The resolution reaffirms that war crimes and crimes against humanity
are subject to universal jurisdiction, calls upon states to assist each other in
‘detecting, arresting, and bringing to trial persons suspected of having committed such crimes and, if they are found guilty, in punishing them.’” Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 375.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 366.
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ing him or other persons,”63 is one of the oldest practiced and
most widely condemned crimes under international law.64 Thus,
all States clearly have a privilege (more commonly labeled a
right in scholarly vernacular) either to extradite an alleged torturer or try him where he is found on the basis of universality of
jurisdiction.65
Even the jurisprudence of the United States condemns torture and acknowledges universal jurisdiction over the torturer,
no matter where the crime was committed, analogizing the torturer to “the pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani
generis, an enemy of mankind.”66 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
“deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.
Thus, whenever an alleged torture is found and served with
process by an alien within our borders [there is] federal jurisdiction.”67

63. G.A. Res. 3452, 30th Sess. U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 34 at 91, U.N. Doc.
A/1034 (1975). Torture as defined in the “Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture” does “not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.”
Id.
64. See Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 370-71. See also
“Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.”
G.A. Res. 57/200, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 77th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/57/200 (2003); “Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.” G.A.
Res. 57/199, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (2003).
65. See Rodley, supra note 58, at 182-83.
66. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 878.
The Filartiga family, citizens of Paraguay, brought this action in the Eastern
District of New York against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, a citizen of Paraguay and the former Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. The
Filartigas claimed that their son had been tortured and killed by Pena as
retaliation for the father’s political activities and beliefs and had autopsies
demonstrating that the seventeen-year-old boy’s death “was the result of professional methods of torture.” When the Filartigas brought an initial action
against Pena in Paraguay their attorney was also tortured and subsequently
disbarred on trumped-up charges. At the time of this suit in the United
States, the suit in Paraguay had been pending over four years. The Second
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In addition to the well established international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction that allow states to extradite or try
perpetrators, an additional body of crimes is gradually gaining
a foothold in the international community and may eventually
afford states the same privilege to try and punish the perpetrator where found.68 Examples of international activities that
have long since plagued the global community, and are rapidly
evolving into “international crimes” that in the near future may
be subject to adjudication under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, include drug trafficking69 and international terrorism.70

Circuit based its jurisdiction over Pena on the practices and obligations of the
international community.
In the twentieth century the international community has come to
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic
human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture…
[C]ivilized nations have banded together to prescribe acceptable
norms of international behavior. From the ashes of the Second World
War arose the United Nations Organization, amid hopes that an era
of peace and cooperation had at last begun.
Id, at 878-79, 890.
68. From the “Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs” in 1960 to the bilateral and multilateral treaties in the following decades, which expanded extraditable offenses to include violations of narcotics laws, there is an everincreasing movement towards the addition of trafficking in narcotic drugs to
the ranks of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction. See CHRISTOPHER L.
BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN LIBERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ITS NATURE,
ROLE, AND IMPACT IN MATTERS OF TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING, WAR, AND
EXTRADITION 140, 214 (1992), citing the 1986 Supplementary Extradition
Treaty Between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; citing the United States–French Supplementary Treaty taken from the United
States Draft Extradition Convention; see also Molly McConville, A Global War
on Drugs: Why the United States Should Support the Prosecution of Drug
Traffickers in the International Criminal Court, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 75
(2000) (advancing the need for an international court and universal jurisdiction over drug traffickers); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 5 (1994) (One of the original jurisdiction proposals for the International Criminal Court was that it
have limited jurisdiction over international drug trafficking only).
69. See Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 369-70, citing
1936 Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 198
LNTS 229 (Murphy notes that this Convention called for “drug traffickers to
be punished by all governments, regardless of the criminal’s nationality or the
place where the crime was committed.”); also citing Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
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82/15/Corr. 1 & Corr.2, adopted by consensus Dec. 20, 1988, reprinted in 28
ILM 493 (1989).
Drug Trafficking’s escalation into the echelons of international crimes
is increasingly due to the fact that the crime is often transnational, includes
or breeds other forms of crime, and demonstrates a serious threat to “international peace and security.” See generally, McConville, A Global War on Drugs,
supra note 68, at 75.
70. The General Assembly Resolution on “Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism” reiterated the World
Conference on Human Rights of June 1993 by stating that
[A]cts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights,
fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted
Governments, and….the international community should take the
necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism.
G.A. Res. 57/219, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/219 (2003).
“Whether the crimes covered by the anti-terrorist conventions may be
classified as “international crimes” is debatable. At the very least, they establish a legal framework for states parties to cooperate toward punishment of
the perpetrators of these crimes.” Murphy, International Crimes, supra note
33, at 368. See also Dinah L. Shelton, The Relationship of International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law to the Political Offense Exception to
Extradition, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 149-50 (Ellen L. Lutz et al.
eds., 1989). As early as the 1970s, the European community recognized the
need for global cooperation in apprehending and prosecuting terrorists. See
BLAKESLEY, supra note 68, at 140-42, citing The European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, E.T.S. No. 90,
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272-76 (1976).
States which were a party to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism “obtaining custody of a person who has allegedly engaged in
that specified violent conduct [are] obligated to prosecute or extradite that
person.” European Convention, supra at art. 7.
Immediately following the terrorist attacks on New York City and
Washington, D.C., the Security Council issued Resolution 1368, in which it
called on all States “to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and [stressed] that
those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring [sic] the perpetrators,
organizers and sponsors of these acts will be held accountable.” S.C. Res.
1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Year, 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
Under Resolution 1377, the Security Council stressed “continuing international efforts to broaden the understanding among civilizations and to
address regional conflicts and the full range of global issues, including development issues [in order to] contribute to international cooperation and collaboration, which themselves are necessary to sustain the broadest possible
fight against international terrorism.” The UN also called on all States to
“become parties as soon as possible to the relevant international conventions
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C. Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court
Considering the legal scholarship and development of international criminal law in the preceding century, the Rome Statute astutely placed the following three crimes squarely within
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes.71 All three were unarguably crimes of universal jurisdiction under customary international law.72
Genocide was defined as
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.73

Crimes against humanity were defined in exhaustive detail.74
A crime against humanity is any murder, extermination,75 enslavement,76 deportation or forcible transfer of population,77 imand protocols relating to terrorism.” S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Year,
4413th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001). See also S.C. Res. 1465, U.N.
SCOR, 58th Year, 4706th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/1465 (2003); S.C. Res.
1456, U.N. SCOR, 58th Year, 4688th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (2003);
S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. SCOR, 58th Year, 4686th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1455 (2003); S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. SCOR, 57th Year, 4678th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (2002); S.C. Res. 1450, U.N. SCOR, 57th Year, 4667th
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1450 (2002); S.C. Res. 1440, U.N. SCOR, 57th
Year, 4632nd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1440 (2002).
71. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 5(1).
72. See Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 364.
73. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 6(a)-(e).
74. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 7.
75. Extermination “includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life,
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring
about the destruction of part of a population.” Id. at art. 7(2)(b).
76. Enslavement was defined as “the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children.” Id. at art. 7(2)(c).
77. Deportation or forcible transfer of population is defined as “forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from
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prisonment, torture,78 rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced disappearance of persons79 or “other inhumane
acts of similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health” committed as part of “a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”80
Sex crimes were also listed as crimes against humanity, including “forced pregnancy,81 enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”82
War crimes were also defined in the statute in great and
painstaking detail. First, war crimes are described as “grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949” [including but not limited to] willful killing; torture or inhumane
treatment, and willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health.83 Also included in the definition of war
crimes were “other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict” such as “intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population…or
against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities.”84 The Statute also defined certain acts as war crimes, regardless of the conflict’s character—international or domestic.85

the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under
international law.” Id. at art. 7(2)(d).
78. Torture is defined as “intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control
of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to, law sanctions.” Id. at art. 7(2)(e).
79. Enforced disappearance of persons is defined as “the arrest, detention
or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts
of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.” Id. at art. 7(2)(i).
80. Id. at art. 7(1).
81. Forced pregnancy is defined as “the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.
This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws
relating to pregnancy.” Id. at art. 7(2)(f).
82. Id. at art. 7(1)(g).
83. Id. at art. 8(2)(a).
84. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(i).
85. Id. at art. 8(2)(c).
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II. STATE DUTY TO ADJUDICATE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERPLAY OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES
In 1913, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld introduced a legal paradigm regarding rights and duties that established a correlative
relationship between the holder of a right and the holder of a
duty.86 Groundbreaking and controversial,87 Hohfeld’s assertion
that for every legal right there was a correlative duty, created a
context in which legal jurists could determine whether a party
had a distinct right for which it was owed a duty or conversely a
privilege for which there was no correlative right.88 A “right”
was a claim, enforceable by state power, “that others act in a
certain manner in relation to the right-holder.”89 According to
Hohfeld, a right was “much more complex than a mere legal
advantage.”90 The weaker claim of privilege, often confused as a
right, entailed “permission to act in a certain manner without
being liable for damages to others and without others being able
to summon state power to prevent those acts.”91 Hohfeld was
primarily concerned with clarifying “the fundamental difference
86. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, supra note 12, at 30.
87. According to Joseph William Singer, Hohfeld’s paradigm evoked a
great deal of contention among legal scholars and practitioners, some of whom
believed it “path breaking” or a “brilliant innovation” and others who thought
it “naïve.” Other scholars debated over whether Hohfeld’s model was too
broad (the eight terms – rights, privileges, powers, immunities, no-rights,
duties, disabilities and liabilities – should be trimmed) or too narrow (the
terms must be increased to create a more usable paradigm, taking into consideration other kinds of legal relationships). Joseph William Singer, The
Legal Rights Debate In Analytical Jurisprudence From Bentham to Hohfeld,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 978, 989-90, 992 (1982).
88. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 3031.
89. Singer, Legal Rights Debate, supra note 87, at 986.
In their review of Richard Primus’ book THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS,
Jack N. Rakove and Elizabeth Beaumont introduce three reasons for exerting
rights in conjunction with Hohfeld’s definition. First, a right may be asserted
to “claim general authority for specific propositions,” secondly, “to attempt to
entrench politically precarious practices,” and lastly “to declare particular
practices or propositions to be of special importance.” Jack N. Rakove &
Elizabeth Beaumont, Rights Talk in the Past Tense, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1865,
1873 (2000) (book review).
90. Ben Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, Human Duties, Obligations, and Responsibilities, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, n.126 (2001).
91. Singer, Legal Rights Debate, supra note 87, at 986.
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between legal liberties ([with corresponding] privileges) and
legal rights [with corresponding duties].”92
Although Hohfeld did not originally discuss his paradigm in
the framework of human rights, eventually his model was applied to the determination of what human rights or “moral
rights” were true rights or “legal claims” and which were mere
privileges or “liberties.”93 Genuine rights cannot be “created” or
“bestowed” by a State, as can liberties or privileges.94 Rather,
States in a Hohfeldian context may only choose to ignore or recognize human rights, and despite an attempt to ignore or disavow those rights, the State’s correlative duty to the right remains.95 Human rights law represents a distinct area of the law
in which legal and moral rights and duties intersect and over-

92. Singer holds that Hohfeld’s motivation for creating this paradigm was
to clear up a centuries-long confusion between rights and privileges. Hohfeld
“criticized his predecessors for not understanding the ‘fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege or liberty.”
Hohfeld’s paradigm clearly established that difference, employing “correlatives [to] express a single legal relation from the point of view of two parties.”
Id. at 987. Hohfeld sought to end the use of the word “right” when the legal
jurist or scholar more precisely intended to “invoke any of the other entitlements.” Rakove & Beaumont, Rights Talk, supra note 89, at 1873.
93. James M. Donovan, Baby Steps or One Fell Swoop?: The Incremental
Extension of Rights Is Not a Defensible Strategy, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 51-52
(2001).
94. Id. at 45-46.
95. Donovan discussed human rights in this context as “rights beyond the
reach of the state because it is not within the state’s power to deprive us of our
humanity other than, perhaps, to kill us. The contrast is presumably between
inalienable human rights and merely civil rights that the state can control,
bestow and withdraw.” He reinforced that true human rights are “inalienable.” Id.
Whether or not certain human rights are inherently born of “natural
law” or are identified by another theoretical philosophy, as societies develop
and change “[States’] understanding and grants of rights to their members
must also change and develop.” Donovan’s concept of emerging human rights
coexists with a practice in which “rights will necessarily be recognized and
enforced piecemeal. The category of ‘human rights’ is therefore a cluster right
that has accreted over time as new rights have been identified and new categories of persons encompassed.” Id. at 56.
For a discussion on human rights springing from natural law, see generally Theordore S. Orlin & Martin Scheinin, Introduction to THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: A COMPARATIVE INTERPRETIVE
APPROACH 22 (Theordore S. Orlin et al. eds.) (2000).
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lap, creating “a range of express, implied, correlative, regional,
and emergent human duties, obligations, and responsibilities.”96
In addition to its duty to ensure that human rights are maintained within its domestic borders, a state also has a role in apprehending and trying those who violate international criminal
laws97 under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction.98 A subject of
ongoing debate is whether that role, under the Hohfeldian
paradigm, is a mere privilege with no corresponding right or
rather an outright obligation with a correlative right vested in
the international community.99 A state’s privilege, often re-

96. Saul wrote that “many legal duties are based on, or codify, pre-existing
moral duties, although all moral duties are not necessarily legally enforceable
ones.” He defined a “duty” as a “task or action that a person is bound to perform for moral or legal reasons,” and an “obligation” as “a moral or legal requirement.” Despite an attempt to distinguish the two, Saul conceded “both
duty and obligation are allied with the idea of coercion, in that they are burdens imposed on, or required of, someone.” Saul, In the Shadow of Human
Rights, supra note 90, at 575, 580 (internal quotes omitted). See also Donovan, Incremental Extension of Rights, supra note 93, at 52 (“Because some
legal rights are obviously not moral rights, the relationship between the two is
neither that of synonyms nor subsets, but instead constitutes a third relationship: Legal rights and moral rights are independent but intersecting categories”).
97. International criminal law “assigns criminal responsibility for certain
particularly serious violations of international law.” Steven R. Ratner, The
Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 237, 238
(1998), citing STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 9 (1997).
98. “Universal jurisdiction may be exercised by a state without any jurisdictional connection or link between the place of commission, the perpetrator’s
nationality, the victim’s nationality, and the enforcing state.” The rationale
behind universal jurisdiction is to “enhance world order by ensuring accountability for the perpetration of certain crimes.” Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes, supra note 41, at 88-89.
Ratner proposes two main purposes for universal jurisdiction: a symbolic one, “as a statement of international concern about the severity of the
act” and as a practical one, “as a means of improving enforcement that generally presupposes universal jurisdiction and requires states to extradite or
prosecute offenders.” Ratner, Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law,
supra note 97, at 253.
99. Ratner concludes that states do have a right under universal jurisdiction to try international crimes but no obligation or duty to do so. Addressing
genocide in particular, he wrote, “[C]ustomary international law clearly recognizes the right (though not the duty) of a state to prosecute for genocide
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ferred to as a right outside the Hohfeldian paradigm, to try for
international crimes developed into a rule of customary international law over the latter half of the twentieth century, despite
criticism and opposition from some international law practitioners.100
When applying the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to
Hohfeld’s categories of correlative rights and duties and corresponding non-rights and privileges,101 a state’s right to try international crimes clearly subject to universal jurisdiction is
recognized under customary international law as an indisputable Hohfeldian privilege.102 Therefore, when a state finds the
perpetrator, national or not, of a recognized international crime
such as piracy, slavery, genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity on its soil, it has the privilege to try that individual regardless of the location of his crime.103 As a mere

committed anywhere, regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator or the
victim.” Id. at 254.
100. Critiquing reports published by Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, renowned international scholar M. Cherif Bassiouni cautioned,
“Universal jurisdiction is not as well established in conventional and customary international law as its ardent proponents, including major human rights
organizations, profess it to be.” Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note
41, at 83, n.1.
Despite scholarly controversy, it is a fact that “many states have jurisdiction to try offenses that have taken place outside their territory.” SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW supra note 31 at 453, 470. Even Bassiouni concedes in
his article that universal jurisdiction exists for certain international crimes,
whether through jus cogens or customary international law, but should be
utilized cautiously. See generally, Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra
note 41.
101. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913), supra note 12.
102. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 9,
254 (1997).
103. For select evidence that these crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction under customary international law see In re Piracy Jure Gentium (1934)
AC 586, supra note 29 (piracy); Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note
41, at 88-89 (slavery); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Art.
2, Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), supra note 45 (genocide); REBECCA
WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (2002), supra note 52 (genocide and war
crimes); “Principles of International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest,
Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity.” G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp.
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privilege, however, the international community has no correlative right to demand that the state apprehend and try the international criminal; rather, under Hohfeld’s paradigm, they
have a non-right, which bestows no expectation that the individual state has or will fulfill a duty or obligation to try.104
Without establishing a duty invested in the states, the international community only has the ability to encourage the state
to exert its privilege; it cannot enforce a right.105 Yet, as the list
of international crimes continues to evolve,106 and new crimes
such as drug trafficking and terrorism slowly begin gaining recognition as possible crimes subject to universal jurisdiction,107
other crimes formerly justiciable as a state’s privilege may have
metamorphosed into crimes for which a state has a duty to adjudicate.108

No. 30, at 78 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); supra note 59 (crimes against humanity).
104. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 3031.
105. For a brief discussion of the pressures international organizations
place on states to exert authority under universal jurisdiction, see Bassiouni,
Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 41, at 83, n.1.
106. The Restatement, in its discussion of the customary law of human
rights, qualifies a short list of acts that violate those laws, which includes
genocide, slavery, slave trade, and a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights. In a comment, the writers of the
Restatement qualify, “the list is not necessarily complete, and is not closed:
human rights not listed in this section may have achieved the status of customary law, and some rights might achieve that status in the future.” If the
rights continue to evolve, then clearly the privilege to try crimes that violate
those rights would grow apace. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. a (1987).
The Reporters’ Notes also indicate that other rights may “already have
become customary law and international law may develop to include additional rights.” It is even noted that an argument has been advanced that
“customary international law is already more comprehensive than here indicated.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 Rep. n.1 (1987).
107. Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 369-70, citing 1936
Convention for the Suppression of Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, 198
LNTS 229, supra note 69; BLAKESLEY, supra note 68, at 140-41.
108. On the evolution of international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, see generally Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383 (2001). “As the fundamental values and
norms of the international system have evolved, so too has the number of
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Among international legal scholars, there is an emerging consensus that for particular international crimes a state’s privilege to apprehend and try perpetrators has undoubtedly ripened
into an affirmative duty or obligation.109 Utilizing Hohfeld’s
paradigm, this maturation of a privilege into a duty stems from
the developing relationship of the international community to
the actual international crimes.110 If some international crimes
transcend a non-right status and assume the label of right, then
the correlative duty must be vested somewhere.111 The principle
that those rights have correlative duties intrinsically vested in
individual states has gained a great deal of weight, rooted in
the international doctrines of jus cogens and obligations erga
omnes.112
In order to establish that states have an obligation to adjudicate international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, it
must first be established that certain rights are indeed held by
the international community.113 Applying the Hohfeldian model,
legal academic Ben Saul asserted, “In civil rights and human
rights law, the most commonly recognized duties are correlative
duties, referring to those duties that complement specific
rights… [A] right is a legal advantage that entails a correspondcrimes established by international law. Some of these new international
crimes have become subject to universal jurisdiction.” Id. at 384.
109. Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, supra note 90, at 585; Samuel
K. Murumba, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets: Themes and Variations, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 5
(1999); Nigel S. Rodley, The International Legal Consequences of Torture, Extra-Legal Execution, and Disappearance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN
RIGHTS 177 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989), supra note 58 (highlighting specific war crimes that, under the Geneva Convention, “oblige states parties to
exercise criminal jurisdiction on the basis of the principle of universality of
jurisdiction”).
110. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 3031.
111. Id.
112. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note
108, at 391-94.
113. ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES: A THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 56-57 (1996). In a discussion
on the ILC-draft on State responsibility, de Hoogh discusses theories behind
international crimes and corresponding state responsibilities and obligations,
particularly regarding “safeguarding the human being… prohibiting slavery,
genocide and apartheid.” Id. at 56.
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ing duty or disadvantage.”114 Major human rights treaties, the
rhetoric of which spans the last two centuries and has gained
increasing prominence in the last half century, support the belief that “the primary responsibility for the protection of human
rights falls upon State Parties.”115 The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reinforces that sentiment
when stating that citizens of the world have “equal and inalienable rights,” which “should be protected by the rule of law.”116
The Restatement on Foreign Relations addresses those rights
promulgated in the Declaration and acknowledges that some
rights enjoy a more conscientious protection.117 “All the rights
proclaimed in the Universal Declaration and protected by the
principal International Covenants are internationally recognized human rights, but some rights are fundamental and intrinsic to human dignity.”118 Subsequently, States have the correlative duty to uphold the “fundamental and intrinsic” rights
that belong to the International Community as a whole.119 Un-

114. Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, supra note 90, at 585.
115. Saul turned for support to human rights documents as old as the
French Revolution’s 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
and more recently the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
1966 International Convent on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It must
be pointed out here, however, that many of the “rights” listed in early documents like the 1688 English Bill of Rights or the 1789 French Declaration of
the Rights of Man are, under the Hohfeldian paradigm, “privileges” as opposed to “rights”. Id. at 588, 610.
116. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Although some of the “rights”
listed would fall under “privileges or liberties” in the Hohfeldian model, traditional rights to which the State owed a correlative duty included the “right to
life, liberty and security of person,” the right not to be held “in slavery or servitude,” and the right not to be “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.” Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Id. at art. 3-5.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. m (1987).
118. Id.
119. See Murumba, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and
the Challenge of Global Markets, supra note 109, at 5 (“As originally conceived
in the Universal Declaration, and in antecedent natural law theorizing, human rights were principally the claims of individuals against or upon the
state or the society it represented. In Hohfeldian terms, the state had the
primary duties correlative to these rights” (internal quotes omitted)); see also
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der the Declaration, “Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating
the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by
law.”120 Under the Hohfeldian model, the implication exists that
the correlative duty to provide an effective remedy lies with the
States.121
In the late twentieth century, momentum increased for a
mandatory requirement upon states to extradite for the commission of all international crimes for which there is universal
jurisdiction, even in the absence of an extradition treaty.122
Such a requirement would consequently transform extradition
for international crimes from a state privilege to a state duty.123
Beyond the scope of universal jurisdiction, there are standard
customs and general principles of international law involving
extradition under treaties, which many states utilize to bring
“international crimes” under their jurisdiction.124 Under the
General Assembly’s 1990 Model Treaty on Extradition, the obligation/duty is analogous to a contract, where the State required
to extradite under the treaty owes a duty correlative to the
right of the State demanding extradition.125 Furthermore, an
argument can be made, implementing the human rights application of Hohfeld, that states are under a moral obligation, arising under natural law, that exists whether or not extradition is
concretely embedded in a treaty.126 While many international
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
cmt. m (1987).
120. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 116, at art. 8.
121. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 12, at 3031.
122. Despite overwhelming scholarly support for universal jurisdiction,
Rebecca Wallace unequivocally holds that there is no duty to extradite in the
absence of treaties; however, she does note that the ILC’s Draft Code of
Crimes, Art. 6 “[s]eeks to impose an obligation on state to extradite an individual alleged to have committed crimes against humanity.” WALLACE, supra
note 52, at 119.
123. Saul, In the Shadow of Human Rights, supra note 90, at 580. Here the
word “duty” can be interchanged easily with the word “obligation.” Both connote burdens “imposed on, or required on, someone.”
124. Model Treaty on Extradition. G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., 68th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (1990).
125. Id.
126. “While legal obligations may be the most familiar form of obligations,
there are also obligations which are not specifically legal, such as those aris-
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crimes have come under universal jurisdiction as a rule of customary international law, the United Nations and other interth
national bodies began at the end of the 20 Century to push
codification of universal jurisdiction over these crimes, particularly through the Model Treaty on Extradition.127 In addition to
affirming the human rights application to the correlative
right/duty contract-model, the Model Treaty encourages states
to update existing treaties, or enter into treaties that conform to
“recent developments in international law,” which include the
consideration and application of universal jurisdiction where
appropriate.128
Earlier treaties dealing with multilateral extradition set basic guidelines for extradition, establishing safeguards that are
applicable when applied to international crimes subject to or
exempt from universal jurisdiction.129 Under the 1957 European
Convention on Extradition, an obligation to extradite under
existing extradition treaties was upheld for cases where the
conditions for extradition had been fulfilled, including “a minimum degree of seriousness”130 and “double criminality.”131 However, where no treaty exists, if it were established that extradition and adjudication for certain international crimes were no
longer privileges but rather duties, confronted States would be
ing from some precept or any kind of duty. Such obligations are inherent in
the very nature of man and are often called moral law.” SATYA DEVA BEDI,
EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 52 (1968).
127. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 124; see also Murphy, International Crimes, supra note 33, at 377.
128. Model Treaty on Extradition, supra note 124.
Additionally, the Model Treaty seeks to assist States in extradition matters
regarding criminal acts of a terrorist character, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, and all other crimes that undermine respect for
human dignity mindful of the “rights conferred upon every person involved in
criminal proceedings.” All of the listed acts are international crimes over
which the debate rages as to whether they have risen to the level of crimes
deserving universal jurisdiction. Id.
129. Christine van den Wyngaert & Guy Stessens, Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters in the European Union, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE 302-04 (John Dugard & Christine van den Wyngaert eds.,
1996).
130. The offense must be punishable with a custodial sentence of at least a
year. Id.
131. The offense for which extradition is requested should be punishable
under the laws of both the requesting and the requested state. Id.
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obligated to comply with the requirements of universal jurisdiction.132
This duty to comply with the obligations of universal jurisdiction arises under the extrinsically bound international concepts
of obligations erga omnes133 and jus cogens.134 Obligations erga
omnes “flow from a class of norms the performance of which is
owed to the international community as a whole.”135 The con132. DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 113, at 164-65.
133. The Latin expression erga omnes means “towards all.” In the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice used the term in its
dicta to describe an obligation a State or States had to the International
Community. “In view of the importance of the rights involved, all states can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.” The Court further expounded on the concept by contextualizing it in
a human rights framework. “Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of
the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.” Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Limited: Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3, p. 33-34; see also MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT
OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 1-2 (1997).
134. Jus cogens has been described as “rules to protect some common concerns of the subjects of law. A contractual arrangement, despite its being
inter parties, may nevertheless affect such general values and interests as are
considered indispensable by a society at a given time.” LAURIE HANNIKAINEN,
PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 1 (1988).
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulated in Art. 53 that
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention a peremptory norm of general international law
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added).
According to Ragazzi, “The origins of the concept of jus cogens are usually traced back to some writings of the earlier part of this century, but the
concept has not been utilized with any degree of consistency in the practice of
States and by international tribunals in the period before the adoption of the
Vienna Convention.” RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES,
supra note 133, at 44-45.
135. NINA H.B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 97 (2000), supra note 13.
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cept, despite its inherent logic, has only in the past half-century
worked its way into the international legal vernacular.136 Jus
cogens norms function “to protect the society and its institutions
from harmful consequences of individual agreements.”137 Lending to the confusion is the fact that beyond acts of slavery,
which have long since engendered the protection of jus cogens,
“relatively few examples of jus cogens enjoy unanimous support;
for many proposed peremptory rules, there are bound to be enthusiastic and lukewarm supporters, as well as open and hidden opponents.”138 Therefore, some legal scholars, like Maurizio
Ragazzi, conclude that the relationship between obligations
erga omnes and jus cogens in the context of human rights is still
developing and “uncertain.”139 Yet, other international scholars
hold to an emerging and flourishing consensus that both concepts have distinct viability and applicability to international
human rights law.140
Perhaps nowhere are jus cogens and obligations erga omnes
more compatible than when applied to human rights and international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction.141 Professor
136. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at
12. Ragazzi points to documents arising in the wake of the Barcelona Traction case of the 1970s: “After the Barcelona Traction case, references to the
concept of obligations erga omnes have occurred both in judgments and advisory opinions rendered by the International Court and pleadings of the parties” (citing in particular to the cases on Nicaragua, East Timor and BosniaHerzegovina).
Because “the precise implications in practice of the concept of obligations erga omnes have not yet been established, and the idea of an action
popularis in international law is not well accepted,” obligations erga omnes
are difficult to define and harder still to identify. JØRGENSEN, RESPONSIBILITY
OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 13, at 94.
137. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 134, at 1.
138. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at
57.
139. Id. at 48-49.
140. Orlin & Scheinin, Introduction to THE JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW, supra note 95 at 1.
141. Ragazzi concludes that the similarities between jus cogens and obligations erga omnes stem from three factors. First, “like obligations erga omnes,
norms of jus cogens are meant to protect the common interests of States and
basic moral values.” Secondly, “classic examples of norms of jus cogens which
emerged during the codification of the law of treaties largely coincide with the
examples of obligations erga omnes given in the Barcelona Traction case.”
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Kenneth Randall noted, “Universal crimes, obligations erga
omnes and peremptory norms may be viewed as doctrinal siblings, sharing the common lineage of a modern world legal order
based on global peace and human dignity.”142 At the Florence
Conference on State Responsibility, a model was advanced to
show the intricate relationship between jus cogens, obligations
erga omnes and international crimes, where a large circle represented obligations erga omnes, within it a smaller circle representing jus cogens, and within that a smaller circle, representing international crimes.143
By analyzing why legal theorists link the three concepts together, one can arrive at a another model for their interrelatedness: “The intention behind the erga omnes theory… is to
sound the death knell of narrow bilateralism and sanctified egoism for the sake of the universal protection of fundamental
norms relating, in particular, to human rights.”144 Similar to the
jus cogens doctrine and its relation to the theory of international crimes, “[obligations erga omnes] is inspired by highly
respectable ethical considerations.”145 When discussing internaAnd finally, Ragazzi concludes that “characteristic expressions attaching to
the concept of jus cogens (such as the international community ‘as a whole’)
occur also in the International court’s dictum on obligations erga omnes.”
RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 72.
Despite the similarities, Ragazzi still concludes, however, “[T]he concept of
obligations erga omnes is independent from that of jus cogens.” JØRGENSEN,
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 13, at 96,
n.19.
142. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,
66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 841 (1988), supra note 52. Randall observed, however,
that “pragmatic, political, and other legal considerations sometimes pose obstacles, whether warranted or not, to the domestic implementation of each of
those principles and doctrines.” Id. at 841.
143. JØRGENSEN, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES,
supra note 13, at 97 (citing G. Gaja, Obligations Erga Omnes, International
Crimes, and Jus Cogens: A Tentative Analysis of Three Related Concepts, in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT
ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 151, 160 (J.H.H. Weiler, M. Spinedi & A.
Cassese eds.) (1989). Jørgensen points out that the ILC adopted this view
that jus cogens “is a narrower category than obligations erga omnes.” Id. at
97, n. 22.
144. JØRGENSEN, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES,
supra note 13, at 96, citing P. Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in International Law 1983 AJIL 77, 432 (1983).
145. Id. at 96.
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tional crimes, Ragazzi warns legal jurists to take caution, no
matter what paradigm is utilized, not to lose sight of the existing “rights and remedies” under established international law.146
The Restatement on Foreign Relations expressly addresses
violations of customary human rights law in the context of jus
cogens and obligations erga omnes, reinforcing the direct relationship between the two doctrines and international crimes.147
The writers of the Restatement explicitly assert that not all
human rights are peremptory norms or jus cogens, but that
genocide, slavery or slave trade, and torture, among a lengthier
list of international crimes, emphatically are.148 Any international agreement “that violates them is void.”149 A clear duty
exists for states to abide by the principles of jus cogens in regard to those listed international crimes. The Restatement unequivocally states that the responsibility is “to all states” –
hence to the international community.150 “Violations of the rules
stated… are violations of obligations to all other states.”151 Additionally, the writers of the Restatement hold that if the obligations to the international community are violated “any state
may invoke the ordinary remedies available to a state when its
rights under customary law are violated.”152

146. Ragazzi includes a very detailed breakdown of international crimes, as
provided by the International Law Commission, which includes “(a) a serious
breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and security… (c) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide,
apartheid…” RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note
133, at 15.
147. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. n - o (1987).
148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987).
149. Id.
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. o (1987).
151. Those obligations are obligations erga omnes. Id.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
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Genocide,153 an indisputable international crime with universal jurisdiction, is a prime example of an international crime to
which the States owe the international community obligations
erga omnes not to commit or tolerate and to which the jus cogens norm applies.154 The writers of the Restatement list genocide first on their list of crimes that violate customary laws of
human rights.155 William Schabas asserts that the sources of
international law support the coexistence of the three concepts
– international crimes, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes –
as a rule of customary international law.156
In the case against Serbia, Judge ad hoc Elihu Lauterpacht
wrote that “the duty to “prevent” genocide is a duty that rests
upon all parties and is a duty owed by each party to every
other.”157 In the judgment on the preliminary objections raised
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that International Court

153. Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, Art. 1 stated that “genocide, whether committed in time of peace or
time of war, is a crime under international law.” Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N. GAOR Res. 260 (III) A,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Dec. 9, 1948). “This treaty is now considered a rule of modern customary international law, bind[ing] on all states (whether they have
ratified the Convention or not) and requiring them to prosecute acts of genocide.” GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 228 (2000).
154. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 444-45 (2000).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987).
156. Turning to the sources of international law, Schabas discusses four
International Court of Justice cases arising as a result of breaches of the
Genocide Convention, namely Pakistan against India (1972), Bosnia and Herzegovina against Yugoslavia (1993) and the Yugoslavia counter-claim (1997),
and the Yugoslavia claim against members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1999). Schabas also references the Barcelona Traction
case and its “oft-cited remark about the erga omnes nature of the prohibition
of genocide.” He refers to the Nuclear Weapons case, in which some states
argued, “The prohibition of genocide (as set out in the Genocide Convention)
was a relevant rule of customary law applicable to the question of nuclear
weapons.” The court did take into consideration that line of argument in deciding the Nuclear Weapons case. It greatly qualified, however, the application of prohibition against genocide to the matter at hand. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 474-75.
157. Id. at 493.
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addressed obligations erga omnes,158 writing, “[T]he rights and
obligations enshrined by the [Genocide] Convention are rights
and obligations erga omnes. The Court noted that the obligations each State thus has to prevent and to punish the crime of
genocide are not territorially limited by the Convention.”159 Ragazzi proposes that the right vested in the International Community, to which the corresponding duty lies with the States, is
not limited to the act of genocide, but rather suggests that “the
character erga omnes would not be restricted to the prohibition
of genocide, but would attach in general to the ‘rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention’, an expression that would
seem to include the obligations to prevent and punish acts of
genocide.”160
The Restatement reinforces the doctrine that all states have a
duty to adjudicate, convict and punish those who perpetuate the
crime of genocide.161 Parties bound by the Genocide Convention
“are bound also by the provisions requiring states to punish
persons guilty of conspiracy, direct and public incitement, or
attempt to commit genocide…and to extradite persons accused
of genocide.”162 If a state failed to act in accordance with its re158. Both the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia had raised the issue. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNES, supra note 133, at 96.
159. Id. (citing Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1996,
p. 23, para. 31).
160. Id.
Bartram S. Brown suggests that states may be more comfortable with the
obligation to punish crimes such as genocide than with an obligation to prevent them. Whether or not that is the case, the analysis would imply that the
duty does exist, despite the states’ willingness to accept that obligation.
Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 108, at
395-96.
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 cmt. d (1987).
162. Id. Even parties not party to the Genocide Convention are under those
obligations. Its provisions have become rules of customary international law.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 Rep. n.3 (1987)(Genocide was declared an international crime as
early as the Nuremberg Charter, but was classified at that time as a “crime
against humanity”). See also Mark A. Summers, The International Court of
Justice’s Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How Has it Affected the Development of
a Principle of Universal Jurisdiction that would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 63, 81-82 (2003) (“Soon after the 1949
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sponsibilities to adjudicate, punish, or extradite perpetrators of
genocide, that state would seriously “breach on a widespread
scale” an “international obligation of essential importance for
safeguarding the human being…”163
An ongoing debate regarding the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is often coupled with any discussion of a state’s duty
to adjudicate and punish genocide.164 A healthy dispute continues to rage regarding its permissibility, absent any discussion
of privileges or obligations.165 The debate dates well before the
Geneva and Genocide Conventions were adopted, their prohibitions against
war crimes and genocide were regarded as customary international law.”).
163. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 Rep. n.3 (1987).
164. As early as Germany’s aggressions of 1933, states of the world considered whether they had a right (or in a Hofeldian context a privilege) to intervene when human rights were violated.
SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 491. The Geneva Convention did not
specify that a state had the privilege or the duty to intervene in episodes of
genocide. Id.
More recently, during the humanitarian intervention undertaken in
Kosovo, President William Clinton stated, “We should not countenance genocide or ethnic cleansing anywhere in the world if we have the power to stop
it.” Bob Davis, Pledging a ‘Clinton Doctrine’ for Foreign Policy Creates Concerns for Adversaries and Allies Alike, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 6, 1999, at A12. This
statement presupposed a right to try and punish when stating that genocide
should not be “countenanced” and proposed an independent state’s privilege to
intervene in its cessation or prevention.
165. HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 134, at 80-81.
In the case of Yugoslavia, Judge Lauterpacht concluded that customary
international law – looking primarily at the practice of the states – might
regrettably hold that “inactivity” on the parts of states to genocidal conduct is
“permissible.” This would reinforce the concept that under the rules of customary international law, there is no duty, if indeed even a privilege, for an
independent state to take actions with the purpose of preventing or ending
genocide. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 495.
Some scholars considered the humanitarian intervention undertaken in Kosovo “illegal but legitimate.” Timothy Garton, Imagine No America, THE
GUARDIAN, Sept. 19, 2002, at 21.
And yet other scholars hold that humanitarian intervention is a rule of
customary international law. International Law Professor Jack Goldsmith
concluded, “If you read the letter of international law, it does not expressly
provide an exception for a humanitarian intervention. But many people think
such an exception does exist as a matter of custom and practice.” William
Glaberson, Conflict in the Balkans: The Law: Legal Scholars Support Case for
Using Force, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at A8.
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establishment of the United Nations and has been a part of international rhetoric since the nineteenth century.166 Due to fear
of over-use and misapplication,167 the international community
including the United Nations has shied away from writing a
direct rule for its application.168 Failing to do so has enabled its
continued abuse and done nothing to mitigate its dangers.169
Despite initial breakdown in the dialogue over whether humanitarian intervention is a legitimate means, many scholars
make compelling arguments that along with the duty to try,
convict, and punish perpetrators of genocide, there is also a
right – or a Hohfeldian privilege – to prevent genocide through
the use of humanitarian intervention.170 Yet a fervent confidence exists among select academics that humanitarian intervention may soon, if it has not already, mature into a state’s
duty where international crimes subject to obligations erga om-

166. “By the end of the 19th century the majority of publicists admitted the
right of humanitarian intervention… However, that doctrine was vague.”
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 134, at 80.
Forcible humanitarian intervention may even have been more palatable prior to the establishment of the United Nations. Armed force was legitimized in the name of humanitarian intervention on a number of occasions,
including the French invasion into Lebanon to assist Christians undergoing
Syrian persecution in 1860, and again in 1877 when Russia invaded Bosnia
and Herzegovina to assist in religious conflicts resulting in severe persecutions of minority peoples. Paul Lewis, The Right to Intervene for a Humanitarian Cause, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1992, § 4, at 22.
167. “Humanitarian intervention is even more malleable than most principles of international law, and is a treacherous ground on which to stand.”
John R. Bolton, Clinton Meets ‘International Law’ in Kosovo, WALL ST. J., Apr.
5, 1999, at A23 (internal quotes omitted), supra note 26.
168. Gwynne Dyer, Same Old Song at the U.N., REC. (N.J.), Sept. 23, 2003,
at Opinion. U.N. members cannot “figure out how to write a rule on humanitarian intervention that could not be exploited by the great powers to justify
neo-colonial interventions.” Dyer concluded that in that case, “it’s better not
to write it at all.” Id.
169. A real danger is the temptation to justify use of force by labeling it a
humanitarian intervention when it is not so or fails to meet any of the established requirements for one. See, e.g., Ian Williams, The Humanitarian Temptation, NATION, Dec. 9, 2002 (book review).
170. After the events in Somalia and Bosnia, it was no longer a question of
“whether States individually or the international community as a whole could
intervene… but rather that they must intervene.” SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 154, at 492.
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nes and the peremptory norms of jus cogens appear.171 Nevertheless, for many international legal academics, a state’s duty
to launch a humanitarian intervention may still be a “maybe.”172
The triumvirate of jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, and international crimes attach to other crimes subject to universal
jurisdiction similar in makeup to genocide, prompting the states
to fulfill their duty to the international community and to
prosecute.173 For crimes against humanity and war crimes,
which “by virtue of their level of atrocity, attract universal jurisdiction,” the obligation to punish, rooted in obligations erga
omnes, must exist.174 Almost two-thirds of all states have, either
through legislation, treaties, or constitutions, granted their
courts authority to “exercise universal jurisdiction over some
conduct amounting to war crimes…”175 Approximately ninety171. During the United States deliberations on whether or not to involve
itself in the conflict raging in Rwanda, State Department spokeswoman
Christine Shelley said that the “United States was not prepared to declare
that genocide was taking place in Rwanda because ‘there are obligations
which arise in connection with the use of the term.’” Id. at 495 (citing PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES, STORIES FROM RWANDA 153 (1998)).
172. According to Michael Walzer, a political philosopher at the Institute for
Advanced Study at Princeton University, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention may suggest a state “ha[s] a right, and maybe an obligation, to go in
and stop it if you can.” Peter Steinfels, Reshaping Pacifism to Fight Anguish
in Reshaped World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1992, at A1.
173. “Customary international law also recognizes any crime that is universally condemned by the international community as a jus cogens international
crime, which gives rise to obligations erga omnes. In accordance with customary international law, an obligation erga omnes requires a state party to extradite or prosecute perpetrators of these crimes found within its territory.”
Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 1830-1976 The
United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation, and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
911, 913-14 (2002).
Ragazzi writes, “[W]hile it is true that the concept of obligations erga
omnes can and does contribute to the protection and promotion of human
rights, it is equally true that human rights are instrumental to the consolidation of such concepts as obligations erga omnes.” RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at 135.
174. ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 153, at 248; see also
Brown, Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 108, at 395.
175. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION – THE DUTY OF
STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION, ch. 1, available at
http://www.amnesty.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2004). Amnesty estimates that
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five states have implemented some form of legislation granting
their courts universal jurisdiction over “persons suspected of at
least some crimes against humanity.”176 Torture is one crime
against humanity often addressed in legislative grants of jurisdiction to domestic courts.177 However, even if a state does not
incorporate grants of jurisdiction into its legislataive or constitutional bodies, customary international law still grants jurisdiction.178 In the Congo v. Belgium case brought before the International Court of Justice, Judges Kooijmanns and Buergenthal concluded, “[E]xercising extraterritorial jurisdiction is
obligatory when the conditions of the post-war conventions are
met.”179
In addition to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, jus cogens and obligations erga omnes are firmly recognized as having dominion over the international crime of aggression.180 Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations
addresses Acts of Aggression, stating that the Security Council
at least 120 states have enacted legislation “which would appear to permit
their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over conduct amounting to some
or all war crimes in certain circumstances.” Id. The extensive list of states
include Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize,
Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic – to name only a few. Id. Although
the majority of the states have never availed themselves of the existing liberties afforded their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction, the international
and domestic legal instruments of the states would permit such a show of
authority.
176. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 175, at
ch. 6. States listed in the Amnesty report include, but are not limited to, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States, and Venezuela. Id.
177. Id.
178. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 175, at
Introduction.
179. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Congo v.
Belgium, supra note 162, at 95 (citing Congo v. Belgium, 2002 I.C.J. at PP 5960 (Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins)).
180. The international crime of aggression can be defined as “an armed
attack by one State against another… bolstered by the requirement that there
must be a serious breach of an international obligation essential for the maintenance of international peace and security.” DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA
OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 113, at 309.
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“shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”181 In the Barcelona Traction case, the first
example cited by the court of an obligation erga omnes is the
“outlawing of acts of aggression.”182
Where a state is unable or unwilling to judge and punish perpetrators of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity,
the duty to adjudicate does not disappear.183 Under the continued use of Hohfeldian paradigm, the international community
has not relinquished its right to retribution; hence the duty remains.184 If a right exists, the correlative duty cannot “impede”
that right.185 In addition, the holder of the right can demand the
“performance of other subjects’ obligations.”186 Because a breach
181. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
182. RAGAZZI, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES, supra note 133, at
74; see also DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES,
supra note 113, at 56, citing the ILC-draft, Commentary Article 19, Part One,
95-96 on State responsibility (Paragraph 3(a) states that “a serious breach of
international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of international peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression” may result
in an international crime).
183. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, supra note 12, at 31-32.
184. Id. Although historically some countries have conducted “fact-finding
followed by forgiveness” as a means of exercising reconciliation for human
rights violations, this method of resolution is unacceptable under the concept
of obligations erga omnes. The practice of “Truth and Reconciliation” is inconsistent “with the view that crimes against humanity attract an erga omnes
obligation to prosecute and punish.” States such as Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile,
El Salvador, Haiti and Argentina, to name a few, violated their duty to the
international community by failing to prosecute and punish and instead imposing a Truth and Reconciliation process upon individuals and regimes that
carried out gross violations of human rights. See generally, ROBERTSON,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 153, at 266-78. See also, Mark S. Ellis,
The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and
National Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 229 (2002).
185. DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 113, at 67 (“If a right has been validly conferred by a permissive rule,
a correlative obligation must be seen to exist not to impede the exercise of
such a right”).
186. Id. “The necessity of correlative rights is postulated on the basis that
there must always be, at least theoretically and to begin with, another subject
of international law entitled to demand the performance of an obligation.” Id.
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of those obligations “generally affect[s] particular or all
States,”187 when a state breaches, the obligation or duty must be
adopted by another state or international forum in order for the
international community to see its rights safeguarded and preserved.188
Increasing support for the view that states cannot harbor
perpetrators of international crimes has strengthened.189 “Under the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) rule,
[states] are required to exercise jurisdiction over such persons
no matter where the crime occurred or to extradite them to a
state able and willing to do so.”190 If no such state exists then
the state should surrender them to an international criminal
court “with jurisdiction over the suspect and the crime.”191
III. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: WHEN STATES
CANNOT OR WILL NOT FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATION IT SHOULD
BE DISCHARGED TO THE CRIMINAL COURT
The ICC was established to function complementarily to national criminal jurisdiction.192 The ICC was never intended to
replace domestic courts prosecuting war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity; rather, the concept of complementarity193 was embraced as a safeguard against fears that the court
De Hoogh notes another compelling necessity that drives the right/obligation
paradigm is the urgency for “an imperative… kind of measure against repetition.” Prosecution, conviction and punishment for those responsible for the
commission of an international crime can secure that assurance. Id. at 165.
187. This suggests that the “international community” at large would suffer
the effects of the breach.
188. DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, supra note 113, at 68.
189. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, supra note 175, at
Introduction.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
emphasizes that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,” but that where a state
cannot fulfill its obligation the court exists to compliment national criminal
jurisdiction. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at Preamble & Art. 1.
193. Complementarity means that “instead of replacing national jurisdictions, the Court will intervene only in those situations where national justice
systems are unavailable or ineffective. Unlike the Yugoslav and Rwanda
Tribunals, the ICC does not have ‘primacy’ over national jurisdictions.”
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could potentially usurp the role of functional domestic courts in
their capacity to adjudicate such crimes.194 If a state is able to
perform its obligation to try perpetrators of these three international crimes, the ICC cannot intervene; where a state is unable
or unwilling to act, however, that state’s obligation will be discharged to the ICC for full and proper adjudication.195
In 1994, the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the
ICC strongly favored a court “complementary in nature.”196
Prompted by a fear that the ICC would challenge state sovereignty and erode existing domestic judicial schemes, complementary jurisdiction seemed the ideal way for the court to assure that the international goal of punishing and eradicating
international crimes like genocide did not undermine functional
state courts that could adjudicate with agility and conscientiousness.197 Subsequently, the ICC was established in 1998
under the principle of “complementarity,” which relegated the
ICC to a deferential role, second in line to adjudicate a crime
only after the state failed to administer justice.198
Mauro Politi, The Rome Statute of the ICC: Rays of Light and Some Shadows,
in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE
TO IMPUNITY 14 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
194. “The concept of complementarity can be viewed as a procedural and
substantive safeguard against a supranational institution curtailing the sovereign rights of nations. It ensures that the judgments of a domestic court are
not replaced by the judgments of an international court.” Ellis, The International Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 219.
195. “[U]nder the concept of complementarity, the ICC will only have jurisdiction if there is a breakdown in the national system of justice or a state simply fails to act.” Id. at 221-22.
196. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 49 (1994), supra note 68.
197. There was a recommendation by the Task Force that care be taken “to
assure that ongoing efforts at mutual legal assistance are not undermined.
Structures must be created that supplement and reinforce existing schemes.
The rule of law must be strengthened and not eroded as a result of the creation of an international criminal court.” Id. at 49.
198. Sarah B. Sewall et al., The United States and the International Criminal Court: An Overview, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Sarah B.
Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
The United States had great fear, however, that the ICC would override state sovereignty by abandoning complementarity. “Therefore, the
United States may remain apprehensive until the ICC demonstrates its reasoning and intent over time.” Id. at 20. That apprehension was manifested in
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Extradition has generated much academic and political concern over the past century.199 The difficulties arising under a
state’s “extradite or prosecute” dilemma fueled much of the
early ICC debates.200 Where the state is unwilling to extradite
or prosecute, the Rome Statute established that the ICC can
step in and exert its jurisdiction.201 Unwillingness may be manifested through sham trials or a state “going through the motions” of investigating and instigating a criminal prosecution
where none is forthcoming.202 Of course it may consist of no trial
at all. One scholar suggested that in order for a government/judicial system to be labeled unwilling there must be a

the United States decision to refrain from participating in the court under the
Bush Administration. That refusal on the part of the United States to support
the ICC has been predicted as a great undermining of the court and increasing its likelihood of potential failure. Scholar Leila Nadya Sadat wrote in
2000, “Sadly, one of the major obstacles to the Court’s successful establishment is the refusal of the United States to participate in the creation of this
new international institution. There is not doubt that the failure of the
United States to join and to support the League of Nations contributed to the
ultimate demise of that institution, and one wonders whether the ICC is similarly doomed before it is even established.” Leila Nadya Sadat, The Evolution
of the ICC: From the Hague to Rome and Back Again, in THE UNITED STATES
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000).
199. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 68, at 47.
One of the greatest frustrations in the United States’ war on drugs has
long been the inability to extradite targeted drug kingpins to the United
States to stand trial. Addressing the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Rights, Chairman John Mica
stated that the key to successful international law enforcement was extradition, particularly with regards to South America. The lack of an extradition
treaty with Mexico was considered an impediment to the United States’ ability to effectively counter drug trafficking and other related international
crimes. International Law: The Importance of Extradition: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 106th
Cong. 1-3 (1999) (statement of Rep. John L. Mica, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
200. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 68, at 47.
201. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 17(3).
202. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURt 66 (2001).
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“systematic pattern of judicial inaction in pertinent cases,” not a
failure to successfully prosecute one or two individual cases.203
Conversely, a state may be willing to prosecute human rights
abuses, but unable to do so. Under the Rome Statute, a state is
unable to prosecute when “due to a total or substantial collapse
or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out is proceedings.”204
Scholar Mark Ellis proposed four likely categories for states
unable to carry out proceedings: (1) states entangled in conflict
(domestic or international); (2) states experiencing political unrest or economic crisis; (3) states in transition; and (4) states
entirely lacking a judicial system satisfying the international
standard.205 Similarly, Mauro Politi offered that certain situations would trigger the court’s awareness of a state unable to
adjudicate, such as the “total or partial collapse of a national
judicial system” or the “presence of [a] sham proceeding [ ] undertaken to shield the accused from criminal responsibility.”206
A wealth of examples arises out of the South American states.
Chile and Argentina, countries which saw gross human rights
violations during the mid-twentieth century under brutal dictatorships, were in many senses unable to properly try perpetrators, despite a willingness to do so, due to the grants of amnesty
or pardons written into law to shield the defendants.207 This
situation fits into Ellis’ second and third paradigms.208 States
experiencing political unrest may, according to Ellis, threaten
the “independence of the judiciary and its proper functioning.”209
A good example of this type of judicial breakdown can be seen in
the political pressure and military threats directed at judges in
Uruguay, resulting in unsuccessful initiatives against human
rights violations until the 2000 election of a president commit203. Remigius Chibueze, United States Objection to the International
Criminal Court: A Paradox of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” 9 ANN. SURV.
INT’L & COMP. L. 19, 41 (2003).
204. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 17(3).
205. Ellis, The International Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 238.
206. Politi, The Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 193, at 15.
207. Roseann M. Latore, Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Victims of Human Rights Violations by South American Military Regimes, 25
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 432-33 (2002).
208. Ellis, The International Criminal Court, supra note 2, at 238.
209. Id. at 239.

File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc

2004]

Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM

Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

247

ted to investigating disappearances and kidnapped children.210
The creation of the ICC was seen by scholars and proponents of
accountability in these fragile democracies of South America as
a maturation of international law, evidenced by the establishment of this forum for adjudication, the sole function of which
was to fulfill the states’ duties to adjudicate where the governments were unable to do so.211
Because states have a duty to prosecute international crimes
under obligations erga omnes, the ICC assures that the duty,
the right correlative to which is vested in the international
community, is fulfilled.212 If the state is unable to promote and
protect human rights through prosecuting those who violate
them, the duty vested in the state can be fulfilled by the ICC.213
Even states not party to the Rome Statute have an obligation
not to frustrate its purpose.214 To do so contravenes the discharge of a state’s obligation to a forum that is capable of satisfying the state’s duty when the state is unable to do so. This
violates the norms of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes,
210. See Latore, Coming Out of the Dark, supra note 207, at 433.
211. Id. at 446.
212. “The Statute of the International Criminal Court will have an important impact on the existing regime of international guarantees for the protection of human rights.” Fausto Pocar, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and Human Rights, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 70 (Mauro Politi
& Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
213.
The current system of international guarantees is essentially based,
both at the universal and at the regional level, on procedures aimed
at establishing whether States observe their obligations to promote
and protect human rights, as set forth in customary rules or treaty
provisions. When violations occur, the purpose of such procedures is
to make a finding in this respect and to set a pressure on the State in
order that it conforms to its obligations.
Id.
214. Giuseppe Nesi, The Obligation to Cooperate with the International
Criminal Court and States Not Party to the Statute, in THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 223 (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001). Giuseppe Nesi concludes that “an obligation to cooperate even for States not Parties that do not sign any cooperation
agreement with the Court could be deduced from instruments different from
the Statute.” He is referring to instruments establishing universal jurisdiction and jus cogens over the crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, such as
the Geneva Convention on Genocide. Id. at 222.
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which mandate that the state punish those who commit crimes
of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.215 The
establishment of the ICC assures that the obligation of the
States to the international community will be carried out,
strengthening the system of accountability.216
This argument for discharging a state’s duty to the ICC finds
greatest strength in universal jurisdiction, despite the ICC’s
purported basis on state consent.217 Early in the ICC’s inception, modern scholars, international practitioners and forwardthinking states pushed for jurisdiction based on universal jurisdiction, rather than on the consent of states.218 In order for the
ICC to effectively complement domestic courts such jurisdiction
was seen as essential and feasible since the ICC only had jurisdiction over crimes already recognized as subject to universal
jurisdiction.219 Under that proposition, a state’s consent to the
ICC was irrelevant; if a state could not or would not fulfill its
duty to prosecute, then automatically the duty would flow to the
ICC, which would exert its authority through universal jurisdic215. Id.
216. Pocar, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and Human Rights, supra note 212, at 72.
217. See KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
CONSENT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION 33 (2000); Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 12. See also Geoffrey Bindman, Illegal U.S. Campaign
Against International Justice: Washington and the International Court, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., July 16, 2003, at 8.
218. Germany proposed that state consent should be irrelevant. Sounding
very much like proponents of universal jurisdiction, the German proposal for
the ICC’s basis of jurisdiction stated,
Under current international law, all States may exercise universal
criminal jurisdiction concerning acts of genocide[,] crimes against
humanity[,] and war crimes, regardless of the nationality of the offender, the nationality of the victims and the place where the crime
was committed… Given this background there is no reason why the
ICC – established on the basis of a Treaty concluded by the largest
number of States – should not be in the very same position to exercise
universal jurisdiction for genocide, crimes against humanity and war
crimes in the same manner as the Contracting Parties themselves.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1998/DP.2, cited in MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 203, at 35.
219. MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 217, at
33; see also JENNIFER ELSEA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OVERVIEW AND
SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 18-25 (2003); SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 202, at 60.
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tion.220 Despite the ICC’s ultimate establishment as consent
based, the fundamental existence of obligations erga omnes and
the principles of universal jurisdiction override that consentbased jurisdiction and compel all states to refrain from interfering with the satisfaction of the international community’s right
to try perpetrators of human rights violations.221
IV. THE UNITED STATES’ BILATERAL IMMUNITY AGREEMENTS
CONFLICT WITH A STATE’S DUTY TO EXTRADITE FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
In 1994, when the jurisdiction of the ICC, its interplay with
the states, and the basis for its authority were all the subject of
hot debate, the American Bar Association’s Task Force monitored the progress towards the establishment of the ICC.222 Discussions regarding the basis of the ICC’s jurisdiction clearly
incorporated a recognition and assertion that jus cogens would
be the earmark of the court’s foundation, the cement that bound
the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes violating “fundamental
norms.”223 Less than ten years later, phrases like jus cogens and
fundamental international norms were no longer included in
the United States’ vocabulary when analyzing or weighing the
ICC’s authority.224 Distracted by unfounded fears that the ICC
220. See MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 217,
at 33.
221. Id. at 33-35.
222. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
supra note 68, at 1.
223. Bowing to development in international law, the Task Force conceded:
[T]here cannot any longer be a principled objection by Americans to
the use of ‘fundamental norms.’ The United States for many years
took the position that there was no such thing as jus cogens and that
therefore it could not be bound by a customary norm to which it had
not manifested its assent during the formative period of the norm.
However, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in Article
53, has now put that matter to rest.
Id. at 11.
224. In 1998, the United States, after years of input on the language, jurisdiction, authority and structure of the court, voted against the ICC along with
China, Iran, Iraq, Israel and Libya. However, before leaving office, President
William Clinton authorized the United States signing of the Rome Statute on
December 31, 2000. The statute was not submitted to the Senate for ratification, and less than two years later in May 2002, the Bush administration nul-
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would use its authority to prosecute a political agenda, the
United States’ focus shifted further away from the underpinnings of the ICC and its inherent jurisdiction over certain international crimes, and instead challenged the ICC’s authority
over Americans and its purportedly limitless autonomy.225
Pointing to General Pinochet’s extradition to Spain to stand
trial for human rights violations executed under his dictatorship in Chile, United States politicians feared machinations by
the ICC to attempt jurisdiction over American Service-members
despite the United States’ withdrawal from participation in the
ICC.226 The legitimacy of the ICC came under attack and the
United States Congress passed the American Servicemembers’
Act, prohibiting cooperation with the ICC and restricting U.S.
participation in peacekeeping missions where a risk of ICC
prosecution existed. It also began blocking military aid to countries unless they signed agreements shielding U.S. troops present in their territory from extradition to the ICC.227
Simultaneously, the United States launched its bilateral immunity campaign to assure that United States citizens would
lified the U.S. signature to the Rome Statute. Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court, supra note 203, at 21-22.
225. The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen
and Officials From the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 1-2 (2000) (statement of Sen. Jesse
Helms, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations).
The U.S.’ fears were particularly unfounded since the complementary
nature of the court assures that established and functional judicial systems
such as the ones in the U.S. would be highly unlikely to ever undergo a challenge from the ICC. Additionally, politically motivated trials would be hard to
launch since the Security Council can stall any ICC prosecution it seems premature or unfounded. Furthermore, a pre-trial chamber must determine that
there is reasonable basis for action. Chris Patten, Globalization and the Law,
EUR. UNION PRESS RELEASES, Oct. 21, 2003, available at 2003 WL 60919637;
Guy Dinmore, Washington Presses Ahead with War Crimes Deals – International Criminal Court, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at 10.
226. The International Criminal Court: Protecting American Servicemen
and Officials From the Threat of International Prosecution: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 4-6 (2000) (statement of Hon. Casper W. Weinberger, Former Secretary of Defense). On Pinochet’s extradition
and its universal jurisdiction basis see Latore, Coming Out of the Dark, supra
note 207, at 440-42.
227. Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001-2015, 116 Stat. 820, 899-909 (2002);
Bruce D. Landrum, The Globalization of Justice: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2002 ARMY LAW 1, 14 (2002).
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never be under the jurisdiction of the ICC, no matter where
they lived or were stationed, no matter what international
crimes they committed. In agreeing to the immunity agreements, foreign governments promised not to honor subpoenas or
warrants issued by the ICC against Americans.228 By November
2003, seventy countries had signed immunity agreements.229
The immunity agreements established that the two agreeing
states would not extradite each other’s citizens to the ICC withJustifying the bilateral immunity
out mutual consent.230
agreements by pointing to the Rome Statute’s Article 98, the
United States stated that the ICC itself allowed for these immunities.231
228. Philip Shishkin & Jess Bravin, German Refusal Involving New WarCrime Tribunal May Further Strain Ties, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2002, at A19.
229. Guy Dinmore, US Attacks European Union Over Immunity Agreements,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at 1.
230. Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court,
supra note 203, at 50.
The United States’ Article 98 Proposal ironically reaffirms the complementary nature of the ICC and its inability to supplant functional national
criminal jurisdiction. However, it still assures that “absent the expressed
consent” of the United States or the signatory state, citizens shall not be “surrendered or transferred by any means to the International Criminal Court for
any purpose or surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity
or third country, or expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender or
transfer to the International Criminal Court.” U.S. Government Article 98
Proposal, available at www.hrw.org (last visited on Aug. 23, 2004).
231. Article 98 of the Rome Statute states:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the
Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the
waiver of the immunity. The Court may not proceed with a request
for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a
person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the
surrender.
Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 98.
David Scheffer, the Clinton administration diplomat who negotiated
Article 98, rebutted the Bush interpretation of Article 98, stating that the
provision was “designed for U.S. military forces stationed overseas, as well as
diplomats and Peace Corps workers. ‘We didn’t care about mercenaries.’”

File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc

252

Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM

[Vol. 30:1

These Article 98 or bilateral immunity agreements contravene a state’s established obligation under customary international law to prosecute and punish perpetrators of international
crimes and, where failing to do so, the ability of the ICC to fulfill the state’s obligation to the international community.232
Governments233 and international law scholars234 around the
world have deemed the agreements illegal for various reasons
under international law.235 Under jus cogens, a treaty cannot
violate certain international norms, and under obligations erga
omnes there is an international norm that bequeaths a duty to
states to apprehend, prosecute and punish those who perpetrate
the international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes
against humanity.236 A bilateral immunity agreement that conPhilip Shishkin & Jess Bravin, EU Offers Deal on U.S. Immunity From Tribunal, WALL ST. J., Sep. 13, 2002, at A8.
232. Additionally, international legal scholars have argued that the bilateral immunity agreements are illegal under the customary international law
principle of pacta sunt servanda, “which obligates a state party not to do anything that will undermine its treaty obligations. State parties to the ICC
agreed in Article 88 to ‘ensure that there are procedures available under their
national law for all forms of cooperation’ listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute.”
Bilateral Immunity Agreements undermine a state’s ability to comply with
the terms of the treaty and accordingly are illegal. Chibueze, United States
Objection to the International Criminal Court, supra note 203, at 51.
233. In September, 2002, France and Germany concluded that exempting
the U.S. from the authority of the ICC “would undermine the tribunal.” U.S.
Exemption from Tribunal Is Opposed, WALL ST. J., Sep. 3, 2002, at A16.
234. Richard Dicker, an international law expert at Human Rights Watch,
stated, “The United States is pressing countries to enter into illegal contracts
with them.” Elizabeth Neuffer, Delegates Discuss US Effort to Limit War
Crimes Tribunal, BOSTON GLOBE, Sep. 6, 2002, at A 13.
235. Swiss Foreign Ministry legal adviser Nicolas Michel stated that his
country favored “a strong and independent court,” and that the US’ attempts
to excuse itself from the court’s jurisdiction would “weaken the court.” Neuffer, Delegates Discuss US Effort to Limit War Crimes Tribunal, supra note
220, at A 13. Heads of legal departments from countries belonging to the
European Union met in September, 2002 to find possible ways of addressing
the United States’ concerns regarding the court without weakening it, but
concluded that much of the court’s existing vulnerabilities were the result of
attempts to appease United States’ concerns. EU Governments Seek Answer
to US Demands Over International Court, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sep. 4, 2002, at
*1.
236. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
UNLAWFUL ATTEMPT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GIVE US CITIZENS
PERMANENT IMPUNITY FROM INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, available at
http://www.amnesty.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
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travenes that established duty, under jus cogens, must be illegal.237
The greatest concern has consistently been the fear that
United States’ actions would undermine the ICC, which indeed
they have.238 By undermining the ICC and frustrating states’
attempts to cooperate with the ICC, the United States commits
a small disservice compared to the infringement on the international communities’ rights, thwarted by the encouragement of
states’ shirking their obligations to “ensure that people responsible for these crimes [i.e. genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity], as the most serious crimes under international law, are brought to justice.”239
V. CONCLUSION
Although the ICC has based its authority on consent and territoriality,240 its most persuasive and sound basis rests on universal jurisdiction.241 The crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction are crimes against humanity,242 war crimes243 and genocide.244 All three have gained firm recognition as crimes over
which there is universal jurisdiction, and are collectively accepted as crimes for which the state has at minimum a privilege, under Hohfeld’s paradigm, to prosecute perpetrators.
Stronger still is the fact that these three crimes have matured
into crimes for which there is a duty, an obligation erga omnes,
invested in the states, to prosecute and punish those who commit these crimes.245

237. Id.
238. US Bilateral “Non-Surrender” Agreements Regarding the International
Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 1, 2002, at *1.
239. NGOs Express Disappointment at Reports that Australia May Sign
U.S. ICC Immunity Agreement: Historic ICC Supporter Has Stronger Role to
Play, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 11, 2003, at *1.
240. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 12.
241. Kofi Annan, Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO
IMPUNITY xiii (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001), supra note 16.
242. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 7.
243. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 8.
244. Rome Statute, supra note 9, at art. 6.
245. Lindsay Glauner, The Need for Accountability and Reparation: 18301976 The United States Government’s Role in the Promotion, Implementation,
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Under jus cogens as established by the Vienna Convention,
an independent treaty is illegal if it conflicts “with a peremptory
norm of general international law.”246 The United States, in its
efforts to immunize its citizens from international criminal accountability, has introduced into the international forum bilateral immunity agreements that directly contravene the discharge of unable or unwilling states’ duties to prosecute international crimes to the ICC.247 When that duty is contravened,
the outstanding right, vested in the international community, a
right bound and transfixed by obligations erga omnes, is left
with an unfulfilled correlative duty for which it is owed completion.
If indeed a time arises when the United States’ bilateral immunity agreements are used as a shield from the ICC, jus cogens, in its intricate relationship with obligations erga omnes
and international crimes, demands that the bilateral immunity
agreements be viewed as illegal – unenforceable and unable to
contravene the proper role of the ICC in its complementary capacity. The failure to do so would do more than simply undermine the ICC; it would shake the delicate and solidifying foundation made up of the union between states’ obligations, the
international community’s rights, and the international crimes
that compel the relationship between the two. The failure to
employ jus cogens in enforcing the illegality of Article 98 immunity agreements will surely weaken that fragile foundation, and
what could have continued to mature into a concrete relationship between rights, duties and the adjudication of international crimes will crumble, too weak to assert its legitimate and

and Execution of the Crime of Genocide Against Native Americans, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 911, 913-14 (2002), supra note 173.
246. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art.
53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, supra note 20.
247. Chibueze, United States Objection to the International Criminal Court,
supra note 203, at 51.

File: Ettari Macro 1123.doc

2004]

Created on: 11/23/2004 2:23 PM

Last Printed: 11/23/2004 4:26 PM

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

255

legal authority based on the sound principles of universal jurisdiction.
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